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NON-TRIAL DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL
OFFENDERS: A CASE STUDY*
[[In many cases effective law enforcement does not require
punishment or attachment of criminal status, and community
attitudes do not demand it. Not all offenders who are guilty of
serious offenses as defined by the penal code are habitual and
dangerous criminals. It is not in the interest of the community
to treat all offenders as hardened criminals; nor does the law
require that the courts do so. It is at the charge stage that the
prosecutor should determine whether it is appropriate to refer
the offender to noncriminal agencies for treatment or for
some degree of supervision without criminal convictions.'
The Citizens Probation Authority of Genesee County (CPA)2
is a program of deferred prosecution and diversion from the
criminal court process of selected criminal offenders. It was ini-
tiated on an informal basis in 1965 by Prosecuting Attorney
Robert F. Leonard as a means of relieving the overcrowded
conditions of the traditional criminal process and of freeing from
the stigma of a criminal conviction those offenders who could
benefit from a community treatment plan. In 1968, the informal
CPA had expanded its operations to such an extent that it was
extablished as an autonomous County department. This article
examines the legal questions surrounding the operation of CPA,
particularly with reference to its justification as a proper exercise
of prosecutorial discretion (since there is no statutory authoriza-
tion for the program) and to the safeguarding of the rights of those
who participate in CPA.
A client's participation in CPA takes place before he is actually
charged with an offense, often even before formal arrest. Any
offender who meets certain criteria, for example, that his sus-
pected offense be a non-violent crime,3 is referred by the prose-
cutor's office to CPA for an interview and investigation. If on the
basis of these preliminary contacts CPA counselors determine
* This article was prepared in connection with an overall study of the Genesee County
Citizens Probation Authority (CPA) which was financed by a grant from the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration (LEAA) of the United States Department of Justice.
1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 5 (1967).
2 Genesee County encompasses the metropolitan area of Flint, Michigan.
I See note 22 and accompanying text infra.
Journal of Law Reform
that the program of probation and counseling, as opposed to
traditional criminal prosecution, would be appropriate treatment,
and if the suspect voluntarily agrees, the prosecutor will allow the
offender to participate in a probationary treatment period of up to
one year under the supervision of CPA. If the client satisfactorily
completes his probation, which may include a requirement of
restitution to the victims of his crime, prosecution is dismissed
and any arrest or booking records are returned. If at the referral
stage CPA decides that voluntary probation would not be appro-
priate treatment, the case is sent back to the prosecutor's office
for normal disposition. Anyone referred to CPA has the right to
withdraw from the program at any time, with the understanding
that his case then becomes subject to prosecution. Additionally,
probation may be revoked and the case sent back to the prose-
cutor's office if the client violates the terms of his probation.
A number of pre-trial diversion projects, similar to CPA, fund-
ed either by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration4
or by the United States Department of Labor,5 have been set up
in recent years in a number of cities around the country. Many are
modeled after the Vera Institute's Manhattan Court Employment
Project in New York and Project Crossroads in Washington,
D.C. While the programs are not entirely identical in operation,
hopefully this discussion of some of the legal issues involved in
non-trial disposition of criminal offenders will be of use outside
the immediate confines of the CPA situation. Ultimately the con-
tinued success and expansion of this type of program depend on
the sociological and penological effectiveness of such treatment
concepts. However, these questions concerning the immediate
and long-range effects on the individual and on the community,
while deserving of study, are outside the scope of this article. 6
I. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
A. Separation of Powers
Although the duty of the public prosecutor is to represent the
4 CPA has been funded in part by LEAA. LEAA has also received applications for
grants for similar programs in other cities.
5 The Manpower Administration of the Department of Labor provides funds because
many of the diversion projects place a heavy emphasis on education and training, viewing
steady employment as the best means of keeping offenders from becoming repeaters.
Currently diversion programs funded by the Department of Labor are operating in Min-
neapolis, Baltimore, Boston, Newark, Clevland, Atlanta, San Antonio, and San Francisco.6 These aspects of the CPA program, including cost-benefit analysis and program
effectiveness, are being studied in an overall evaluation of CPA of which this article is a
part. The entire project is being coordinated by CPA.
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state in all criminal proceedings, 7 one fundamental premise of
American criminal procedure is that a public prosecutor may act
according to his own discretion in deciding whether to charge an
individual with a particular offense. 8 The precise limits of this
discretion have never been clearly defined, in part because of the
inherent difficulty,9 and, indeed, undesirability' ° of doing so.
While the commentaries have discussed the subject extensively,"'
courts treat it with a broad brush. 12 The available material sug-
gests that the scope of the discretion is very broad' 3 and that
judicial checks on the exercise of that discretion are few.' 4
7 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 49.153 (1967).
8 See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 188- 91 (1969).
9 See Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 838 (1963), where the court discusses the myriad and complex factors which the
prosecutor must consider in making his charge decision. The varying weight to be ac-
corded each factor in individual decisions makes it impossible to define clear limits to thes'e
discretionary value judgments.
10 The very multitude of factors which makes precise limits hard to define is also an
argument for not attempting such a definition. Since the purpose of discretion is to make
possible a consideration of shifting factors of varying importance, strict mathematical
formulae may only promote injustice. The counter-argument is that wide-ranging dis-
cretion, by allowing for individualized decisions at the expense of the rule of law, promotes
injustice. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).
11 For a concise, useful discussion see LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the
United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532 (1970). Other recent articles include: Comment,
Prosecutorial Discretion in the Duplicative Statutes Setting, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 455
(1971); Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints, 42 S.
CAL. L. REV. 519 (1969); Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw.
U.L. REV. 174 (1965); Nedrud, The Role of the Prosecutor in Criminal Procedure, 32
U.M.K.C.L. REV. 142 (1964). The classic work remains Baker, The Prosp-
cutor- Initiation of Prosecution, 23 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S., 770 (1933).
12See, e.g., People ex rel. Leonard v. Papp, 386 Mich. 672, 194 N.W.2d 693 (1972)
(judge has no authority to accept a guilty plea to a lesser offense over the objection of the
prosecutor); Taliaferro v. Locke, 182 Cal. App. 2d 752, 6 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1960) (man-
damus would not lie to compel district attorney to prosecute at the request of a third
person); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Cox v.
Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965) (prosecuting attorney belongs to executive branch of the
government and courts will not interfere in decisions within his discretion); Moses v.
Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1963) (mandamus would not lie to compel attorney
general to prosecute at the request of a third person); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); State v. Cory, 204 Or. 235, 282 P.2d 1054 (1955); People v. Birming-
ham, 13 Mich. App. 402, 164 N.W.2d 561 (1968); Bloss v. Williams, 15 Mich. App. 228,
166 N.W.2d 520 (1968). Cf. Lloyd v. United States, 343 F.2d 242, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
(Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 952 (1965).
13 The scope of the prosecutor's discretion is usually held to be limited only by the
constitutional requirements of equal protection. The courts realize that the prosecutor
cannot bring charges against every law violator, and they accept many justifications for
selective enforcement of the laws. The prosecutor abuses his discretion only where there is
an intentional purposeful discrimination. Thus, a criminal conviction will be reversed
where "the selective enforcement is designed to discriminate against the persons prose-
cuted, without any intention to follow it up by general enforcement against others." People
v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 225 N.Y.S.2d 128, 136 (App. Div. 1962). See also Two Guys
From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 179 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd,
366 U.S. 582 (1961), an action to enjoin selective enforcement of Sunday blue laws, citing
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1943).
14 In court it is difficult to challenge successfully the prosecutor's exercise of discretion.
A person against whom prosecution is initiated has the heavy burden of showing purpose-
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Nevertheless, the CPA program is a sufficiently basic altera-
tion of the prosecutor's standard operating procedures to bring
into question the proper scope of the discretion vested in his
office. This program of large scale diversion' 5 of suspected
offenders from the criminal process could be viewed as an execu-
tive encroachment upon what is properly legislative power. Speci-
fically, according the probation opportunity to some and denying
it to others pursuant to established referral criteria1 6 might be
viewed as a usurpation of the legislature's function of defining
classes of offenders and the appropriate treatment for each such
class. 1 7 To forestall such possible objections and to assure CPA's
legality, legislative authorization for the program would be use-
ful .I
However, if the basic concept of prosecutorial discretion is
above objection, legislative authorization, although useful, is not
necessary. Systematic pre-judicial disposition of offenders through
CPA is not, properly viewed, an expansion of traditional prose-
cutorial discretion; rather, CPA acutally regulates that discretion
within proper bounds. Every prosecutor's office engages in
large-scale diversion of offenders through plea-bargaining, refusal
to prosecute, or similar practices. If there are no controlling
criteria, this diversion takes place on an ad hoc basis and may be
influenced by illegal factors such as class or racial prejudice or
political pressure. CPA standardizes the operation of prose-
cutorial discretion through the promulgation of rules and regu-
ful discrimination. See note 13 supra. A suspect against whom prosecution is not instituted
is hardly likely to complain; and courts will seldom let a third party, such as the victim of a
crime, force the prosecutor to act.
The Court cannot compel him to prosecute a complaint, or even an in-
dictment, whatever his reasons for not acting. The remedy for any dereliction
of his duty lies, not with the courts, but, with the executive branch of our
government and ultimately with the people.
Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also Moses v. Kennedy,
219 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1963).
15 In 1970, CPA received 1,000 new referrals from the prosecutor's office. Citizens
Probation Authority Statistical Comparison-Yearly Summary (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
16 For a discussion of these criteria and the decision-making process, see notes 21-27
and accompanying text infra.
17 Unlike the United States Constitution, the Michigan constitution contains a specific
separation of powers clause.
The powers of government are divided into three branches; legislative, exec-
utive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise
powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in
this constitution.
MICH. CONST. art. 3, § 2.
18 An example is provided by a -Maryland statute that provides courts with authority to
impose probation without verdict. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641 (1971). Note that the
Maryland statute gives this power solely to the court, not to the prosecutor to be exercised
as an aspect of prosecutorial discretion.
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lations, to the end not of expanding the scope of discretion but of
exercising that discretion more intelligently. The prosecutor still
makes an individualized, case-by-case determination of whether
to prosecute; CPA enables him to have more and better in-
formation about the suspect at the time the decision is made and
offers the prosecutor a useful alternative to traditional criminal
prosecution.
B. Delegation of the Charge Decisions
Even if the concept of prosecutorial discretion provides a
sufficiently broad legal basis to support CPA as presently admin-
istered, a question remains as to whether the prosecutor's def-
erence in almost all cases to CPA's conclusions with respect to
the bringing of charges is a permissible delegation of his deci-
sion-making power.19 In a case in which the suspected offender
has not been arrested, the prosecutor or his deputy first must
decide whether a request for a warrant is appropriate. 20 When
lack of sufficient evidence or any other reason makes a request
inappropriate, the prosecutor does not refer the suspect to CPA.21
Where a warrant request is appropriate or the suspected offender
is already in custody, the prosecutor must refer him to the CPA
for a pre-charge report unless the crime falls within a narrow and
specific list of exceptions. 22
Referral, however, does not assure acceptance into the CPA
probationary program and consequent suspension of criminal
charges. 23 The referred offender is immediately scheduled for an
initial interview with a member of the CPA staff to determine his
(1) willingness to accept moral responsibility for his unlawful acts;
(2) consent to a further investigation that will enable the CPA to
19 The prosecutor usually accepts a recommendation for referral made by the CPA. In
1968, 55 out of a total of 391 referrals requested by the CPA were rejected. In 1969, 143
out of 743 referrals were rejected, whereas in 1970 the proportion of rejections declined
further to 144 out of 1,000. Citizens Probation Authority Statistical Comparison-Yearly
Summary (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
20 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.1 (1968).
21 Prosecutor's Policy and Procedures for Referral to Citizens Probation Authority of
Genesee County (mimeographed materials wn file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform) [hereinafter cited as Prosecutor's Policy and Procedures].
22 Cases in which referral will not be made are offenses involving criminal conspiracies
not of an incidental or temporary nature and crimes involving physical assault or in-
timidation. Minor sex offenses which do not seriously threaten a person's well-being, such
as indecent exposure and statutory rape between consenting parties, are referrable. Cases
of carrying concealed weapons are referrable unless the behavior of the accused entailed
necessarily injurious consequences. Cases of possession of soft narcotics, which until
recently were referrable to CPA, are now referred to a separate agency, the Genesee
County Regional Drug Abuse Commission. Preoseutor's Policy and Procedures.
2 Summary Description of the Citizens Probation Authority (mimeographed materials
on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter cited as
Summary Description].
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decide whether his social history prevents acceptance into a com-
munity treatment plan; 2 4 and (3) willingness to fulfill the pro-
gram's expectations of him.2 5 Once the CPA staff determines that
an individual is amenable to community supervision during a
period of probation, it develops a plan directed at short-term
treatment of recent behavioral problems. Within three weeks it
submits a "pre-sentence type" investigation and report to the
prosecutor who then makes the final decision whether to press
charges or suspend prosecution during the probationary period. 26
The offender who is accepted is asked to sign a moral contract
with the prosecutor wherein he agrees to abide by the terms of his
probation.2 7
Any de facto delegation of the charge decision by the prose-
cutor to CPA is nonetheless consistent with the traditional legal
basis for prosecutorial discretion because impartiality of the
charge decision is not impaired and ultimate control of the charge
decision still resides in the prosecutor. One basis of prosecu-
torial discretion is the American belief that a public official is
more capable of making impartial decisions concerning the advis-
ability of bringing charges against an offender than is a private
complainant-the person who in effect made the charge decision
under the old English system of criminal justice.28 Permitting
CPA participation in the charge decision does not vitiate the
necessary impartiality of public prosecutions. To the contrary, the
CPA staff is likely to be less partial than state prosecutors. Unlike
24 If the referred offender's personal history indicates that the instant offense was part of
a continuing pattern of anti-social behavior, a recommendation that the referred offender
not be admitted to CPA probation will be made to the prosecutor. Summary Description.
25 These expectations are generally of rehabilitation, such as reforming negative atti-
tudes toward law and authority. Prosecutor's Policy and Procedures.
26 See note 19 supra.
27 The usual conditions of probation will include requirements that the client not leave
the state without the written consent of the probation counselor, that he report periodically
to his probation counselor, and that he not associate knowlingly with law violators. In
appropriate cases, the client may also be required to continue in school or to make
restitution. Citizens Probation Authority Voluntary Probation Agreement (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
28 See F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A
CRIME 295 (1969). See, e.g., Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99 (1875), and Biemel v. State,
71 Wis. 444, 37 N.W. 244 (1888). Numerous judicial opinions denying the right of private
citizens to compel prosecution reflect the same policy. See, e.g., United States v. Brokaw,
60 F. Supp. 100, 101 (S.D. I1. 1945); State ex rel. Steeb v. Holovachka, 236 Ind. 565,
570, 142 N.E.2d 593, 596 (1957); Herman v. Morlidge, 298 Ky. 632, 183 S.W.2d 807
(1944); Jummonville v. Herbert, 170 So. 497 (La. Ct. App. 1936): Hassan v. Magistrates
Court, 20 Misc. 2d 509, 511- 12, 191 N.Y.S.2d 238, (Sup. Ct. 1959), appeal dismissed, 8
N.Y.2d 750, 168 N.E.2d 102, 201 N.Y.S.2d 765, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 844 (1960). See
also cases cited in note 14 supra.
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the latter, the CPA worker is less susceptible to pressures from
interested parties.29
It might be argued that this very impartiality makes the CPA
staff insensitive to public opinion regarding the types of persons
who ought to participate. Judicial deference to the judgment of
public prosecutors has often been justified by the belief that the
prosecutor, especially an elected state prosecutor, makes charge
decisions that accurately reflect community values.30 But this
objection loses its force when one considers that although the
CPA worker is protected from improper pressures concerning
individual cases, the fact that the CPA program was established
by the prosecutor and is always under his ultimate control assures
sensitivity to community values.
Thus, CPA operates as a supplement to, and not a replacement
of, the prosecutor's office. It impairs neither the legal justifications
of prosecutorial discretion nor the prosecutor's final control over
the charge/no charge decision. Rather, CPA enhances the knowl-
edge and expertise necessary for a just decision-making process.
C. Referral of Multiple and Adult Offenders
In deciding whether to suspend criminal proceedings, the pros-
ecutor must of course consider the public interest.31 Specifically,
in the exercise of his discretion a prosecutor must not jeopardize
the safety of the public.a 2 That most previous programs for the
non-trial disposition of offenders who could have been convicted
usually have involved first and juvenile offenders 3 raises the
question whether the prosecutor's practice of referring adult and
multiple offenders to CPA is violative of public policy and, as
such, an abuse of discretion.
The fact that CPA embraces pre-trial disposition of adult and
multiple offenders does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
29 Since its staff is not elected, there is little possibility that political expediency will
influence CPA's decision to accept a given individual.
30 F. MILLER, supra note 28, at 154- 56.
31 The prosecutor must decide whether public policy would justify the prosecution of
acts that fall within the terms of a criminal statute. See, e.g., Howell v. Brown, 85 F. Supp.
537, 540 (D. Neb. 1949), and Hassan v. Magistrates Court, 20 Misc. 2d 509, 514, 191
N.Y.S.2d 238, 243 (Sup. Ct. 1959). Although courts rarely state explicitly that the interest
of the community is a major factor in the charge decision, it is clear that in practice it is.
See, F. MILLER, supra note 28, at 287-92. See also Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630,
634 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
32 Prosecutor's Policy and Procedures states that "[a~ll rehabilitative endeavors of this
program are subordinate to the primary and over-riding concern for public security."
33 See the discussion of such programs in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 6 (1967).
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the program is not in accord with public policy. The low rate of
recidivism among individuals who have participated in the CPA
program3 4 refutes, as a practical matter, any assertion that the
program compromises the security of the community. Indeed, the
generally higher rate of recidivism among juvenile offenders as
compared to adult offenders 35 indicates that CPA acceptance of
adults endangers the community less, not more, than acceptance
of juveniles.
D. Advantages of Systematization
The President's Crime Commission saw prosecutorial dis-
cretion as a potentially useful tool in the administration of jus-
tice.3 6 Yet before that discretion could be fully utilized in a
rational and intelligent manner, three deficiencies in the normal
exercise of discretion had to be corrected. Currently, most prose-
cutors suffer from a lack of sufficient information on which to base
decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute, a lack of clearly stated
standards to guide their decision-making, and a lack of established
procedures to implement their decision-making.3 7
CPA serves to remedy these three deficiencies. By requiring
that a preliminary interview with and an investigation of the
suspect be conducted, and that a report be submitted to the prose-
cutor,3 8 CPA provides the prosecutor with information about the
suspect before he makes the charge/no charge decision. Further,
the prosecutor has set forth explicit, published criteria to guide
the decision-makers.3 9 Finally, there is an established procedure
for making the decision.40 Thus, the CPA program systematizes
the discretion so as to make it more controllable. 41 Realizing that
34 The rate of recidivism, that is the rate of arrest during probation, has consistently
remained under 4 percent, with many of those being so-called "technical violators."
Summary Description.
35 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 55 (1967).36 Id. at 133.3 7 Id.
38 See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
39 See notes 21- 25 and accompanying text supra.
40 See notes 20- 27 and accompanying text supra.
41 Controllable not only in the sense of managerial control by an executive (the prose-
cutor) over subordinate workers (the prosecutor's staff), but also in the sense of making
the prosecutor's decision more amenable to judicial review. The creation of CPA and the
promulgation of regulations have in effect, established a new administrative agency. Ar-
guably, therefore, in a proceeding for judicial review of administrative action, a person who
fits within the class of persons described in the CPA program's published criteria for
admission should be able to assert due process and equal protection rights if he is denied
admission to the program on illegal grounds. The self-imposed rules of the program
currently state that "[flailure to refer an offender who meets the referral criteria pre-empts
the authority of the prosecuting attorney and denies that offender equal opportunity before
the law." Prosecutor's Policy and Procedures.
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not all offenders can or should be processed through the con-
ventional criminal justice system, the CPA program provides a
rational process for deciding which offenders become subject to
full criminal sanctions and which to more informal disposition.
The aim of this structuring is to make the exercise of discretion
less haphazard and more likely to serve beneficial ends.
II. PROTECTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PARTICIPANTS
This part of the article deals with the rights of participants in
the CPA program and safeguards necessary to protect those
rights. The primary concern will be to analyze the availability to
participants in the CPA program of constitutional protections
guaranteed to individuals formally charged with a crime. The
following discussion will consider how best to preserve the CPA
client's fundamental rights without destroying the effectiveness of
the CPA treatment plan.
A. Showing of Probable Cause
It is necessary first to examine the constitutionality of an un-
stated but fundamental premise on which the program is built:
that an individual may consent to restrictions of his liberty im-
posed by governmental authority, without any independent show-
ing by the government of its right to exert such control over the
individual. The restrictions on liberty suffered by the CPA client
are not insubstantial. 42 Although the client voluntarily agrees to
abide by these restrictions, the theory of our government is that
the right to liberty is inalienable, the implication being that an
individual cannot contract away his liberty. 43
The legal issue becomes whether as presently structured CPA
bases participation on an unconstitutional condition-the forfei-
ture of due process rights to a determination of the sufficiency of
the government's grounds for asserting control over the in-
dividual. Since the CPA client has not been convicted of any
crime, it is not proper to view his probation as punishment.
Conceptually, the restrictions on his liberty are merely substitutes
for arrest and pre-trial detention, restrictions to which any citizen
suspsected of a crime is subject. Although there is no con-
stitutional right of freedom from arrest, the arrest must be carried
42 See note 27 supra.
43 This, of course, is an idea basic to the American democracy, appearing, for example,
in the Declaration of Independence.
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out in accordance with due process.4 4 The essential difference
between the typical arrest situation and the CPA situation is that
in the former, in order to obtain a warrant to arrest a suspect the
government must show probable cause to believe him guilty of a
crime. 45 Participation in CPA, on the other hand, usually takes
place without the prosecutor's ever obtaining a formal warrant. 46
The client spends as much as a year under the control of CPA
without any procedural check on CPA's assertion of that con-
trol. 47
This objection to the CPA structure, while constitutional in
nature, can be obviated by means of relatively simple procedural
changes. The existing policy of the prosecutor's office is that it
will not refer a person to CPA when the evidence is insufficient to
secure his prosecution. 48 Presently this is a unilateral decision, in
the uncontrolled discretion of the prosecutor's office. Although
the demands of due process vary, depending on the situation,49
due process would seem to be met if the CPA program contained
a procedure for independent determination of the sufficiency of
the prosecutor's case. For example, the program might make it a
matter of policy to obtain a formal arrest warrant for every client.
The extent of the showing required would be probable cause to
believe the suspect guilty.50
B. Representation by Counsel at CPA Proceedings
1. The Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process-There are two possible stages in the CPA program at
which the assistance of counsel would be particularly important.
44 In Beauregard v. Wingard, 230 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Cal. 1964), the court, in consid-
ering whether an arrest by state officers without due process of law gave rise to a cause of
action under a federal civil rights statute, said at 185: "There is no question that freedom
from arrest ... except through due process [is a right] 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' and guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against invasion by the State."
45 This requirement of a showing of probable cause is based on the fourth amendment,
which was held to apply to arrest as well as search warrants in Giordenello v. United
States; 357 U.S. 480 (1958). See also Brown v. Fauntleroy, 442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir.
1971), and Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
46 For a description of the CPA procedure, see text accompanying notes 20- 27 supra.
47 Arguably, this deficiency has no harmful practical effect. Anyone who is so free even
of the appearance of guilt that the government could not show probable cause would
probably refuse participation in CPA, thus bringing into play all the procedural safeguards
of the normal criminal process. However, this hardly seems to be a valid argument against
conforming CPA practice to the requirements of due process, especially if such conformity
would be a rather simple matter.48 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
49 "The requirements of due process are a function not only of the extent of the
governmental restriction imposed, but also of the extent of the necessity for the restric-
tion." Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965) (footnote omitted).
50 See note 45 supra.
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At the time of the initial referral an attorney's advice would
enable a prospective client to make an informed decision as to
whether to participate in the program. Also when a CPA client is
threatened with revocation of his conditional probation, counsel
could assist him in demonstrating that such action is unjustified.
The right to counsel in criminal proceedings involving felo-
nies51 is guaranteed by the sixth amendment, 52 as made applicable
to the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.53 The sixth amendment entitles the accused to the assis-
tance of counsel in "all criminal prosecutions," and the Supreme
Court has interpreted this provision to mean that an accused is
entitled to the guidance of counsel at every critical stage in the
proceedings. 54
It has been held that the accused must be afforded the assist-
ance of counsel in a state hearing revoking probation and impos-
ing sentence. 55 In Mempha v. Rhay56 the sixth amendment was
deemed to require appointment of counsel at every stage where
substantial rights were affected. 57 Although Washington state pro-
decure 58 directed that the probationer who has violated the terms
of his probation receive the maximum sentence prescribed for his
original offense, the Court held that substantial rights were in-
volved since the sentencing judge recommended the length of time
the person should actually serve before becoming eligible for
parole.
The decisions of courts considering whether Mempha compels
51 Offenders who are charged with misdemeanors have not been considered to be
constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel. In the past the Supreme Court has
denied certiorari in cases raising the issue of whether the refusal to appoint counsel for
indigent misdemeanants may be a denial of equal protection. (See the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Stewart in DeJoseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1965), where the Court
denied certiorari to consider this issue.) A Florida case holding that an indigent mis-
demeanor defendant is entitled to counsel only when the offense is punishable by a
sentence of more than six months currently is before the court. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236
So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 908 (1971), restored for reargument, 404
U.S. 999 (1972). Under existing decisions, however, the following discussion applies only
to those CPA participants who may be subsequently charged with felonies.
52 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.53 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Furthermore, MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 20, as implemented by statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 763.1 (1968), echoes this guarantee. See also id. § 768.7 providing for the appoint-
ment of counsel to represent prisoners accused of crimes.5 4 The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to indicate definitely that stage of the proceedings at
which the right to counsel attaches. It has, however, held that counsel must be furnished at
any critical stage and that such a stage is "any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal,
in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair
trial." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967) (footnote omitted).
55 Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 134.
58 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.95.010, 9.95.030 (1959).
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a state to provide counsel at parole revocation hearings predict
the impact of Mempha on the right to counsel in CPA proceed-
ings, for the analogies between parole and the CPA program are
striking. Both parole and the CPA program have as one of their
primary purposes rehabilitation of the participant. Moreover, al-
though parole proceedings take place after sentence has been
imposed while participation in the CPA program occurs prior to
the initiation of formal criminal charges, neither involves an adju-
dication of the suspect's guilt or innocence. A parole board deter-
mines whether a prisoner has been sufficiently rehabilitated to be
eligible for conditional release. CPA evaluates an individual's
psychological and sociological history in order to determine his
amenability to a treatment plan. 59 Unlike a jury which must deter-
mine as a matter of fact whether a defendant is guilty of the
behavior charged, a parole board, like the CPA staff, subjectively
evaluates the character and prospects of the individuals appearing
before it.
In view of the functional analogy between CPA and a parole
board, it is significant that most federal courts hold that Mempha
does not imply a sixth amendment requirement of assistance of
counsel at parole, as opposed to probation, revocation hearings.60
Mempha is often said to stand only for the proposition that
counsel is required at deferred sentencings. 6 1 In Beardon v. South
59 The CPA staffdecides whether the alleged offense is part of an established pattern of
anti-social behavior or an isolated incident of unlawfulness. The individual's willingness to
accept responsibility for his previous unlawful behavior is an important factor in the
CPA's decision to treat an offender initially referred by the prosecutor. Summary Descrip-
tion.
60 See, e.g., Shaw v. Henderson, 430 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1970); Rose v. Haskins, 388
F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d
942 (8th Cir. 1971); Mead v. California Adult Authority, 415 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1969).
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth and Tenth Circuits have also
held the sixth amendment does not guarantee counsel at parole revocation hearings. The
decisions recognize that in extraordinary cases due process may compel the state to
provide for the appearance of counsel if the fairness of the proceedings would otherwise be
impaired. See United States ex rel. Halprin v. Parker, 418 F.2d 313 (3d Cir. 1969) (the
appointment of counsel was not necessary because appellant was arrested for an admitted
violation of the terms of his parole and therefore could only attempt to persuade the board
to overlook the violation); Beardon v. South Carolina, 443 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1971)
(counsel need be appointed only when the parolee denied the existence of a violation and
when the fundamental fairness of the proceedings would be impaired by the absence of
counsel); Alverez v. Turner, 442 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom.,
McDomman v. Turner, 339 U.S. 96 (1970) (the opportunity to appear with appointed or
retained counsel must be available to every releasee whenever an issue of disputed fact is
involved).
61 See Williams v. Patterson, 389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968), where the court refused to
overrule a case decided before Mempha which denied parolees the assistance of counsel at
parole revocation hearings. In the court's view, the United States Supreme Court held
only that "the defendant was entitled to the assistance of counsel 'at the time of sentencing
where the sentencing has been deferred subject to probation.' " Id. at 375.
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Carolina, 62 the Fourth Circuit suggested that Mempha does not
compel states to furnish counsel at parole revocation proceedings,
because the burden of providing counsel is heavier than in the
case of probation revocation. The court posited that a parole
revocation proceedings, unlike probation revocation hearings,
would probably not occur in the same district as that in which the
individual was originally tried. Moreover, more time was likely to
intervene between trial and parole revocation proceedings than
between trial and probation revocation hearings. Therefore the
attorney who represented the releasee at his original trial could
also represent him at probation revocation proceedings with little
additional effort, but this would not be possible in the case of a
parolee. However, this rationale should not be dispositive of the
issue whether the sixth amendment requires the presence of coun-
sel at parole revocation.6 3 Moreover, the Beardon court's holding
that counsel is not required at parole revocation hearings does not
apply to CPA proceedings. The burden of providing counsel to
assist the CPA participant either at the time of referral or at a
limited hearing prior to revocation 64 would not be as great as that
of providing counsel at parole revocation hearings. CPA proceed-
ings take place in the same city in which a subsequent trial would
be held and would have to take place within a short time of the
trial because the maximum probationary period is one year. The
burden of providing counsel at an informal revocation hearing
would be even less than that of providing counsel to all potential
clients at the referral stage, because, should probation be re-
voked,6 5 the right to counsel in any event attaches shortly there-
after when the accused appears before a judge or magistrate. 66
There is a second and more frequently given reason for the
inapplicability of Mempha to proceedings before parole boards.
The danger of the loss of certain legal rights, such as the right to
appeal and the right to withdraw a plea of guilty, which was a
major factor motivating the Supreme Court's decision, 67 does not
62 443 F.2d 1090, 1092 (4th Cir. 1971).
63 See Judge Winter's dissenting opinion, id. at 1097. "1 cannot read Mempha ... to rest
on the premise that the degree of the burden on the convenience of counsel is a determin-
ing factor of when the right to counsel attaches."
64 See part I1 E 2 infra.
6 The CPA could revoke probation if the client violated the terms of his probation. A
violation of the law, leaving the state without the counselor's consent, failure to report to
CPA regularly, association with known criminals, or refusal to make restitution payments
could result in revocation. Summary Description.
6 Any person accused of a felony may request the state to provide counsel at the time
he first appears before a justice of the peace or magistrate. Upon a proper showing of
indigency, the state must then furnish counsel at public expense. MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 775.16 (1968).
67398 U.S. at 135-36.
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arise in parole revocation proceedings.68 Parole is said to be a
privilege, and not a right; and in Hyser v. Reed the D. C. Circuit
decided that therefore the assistance of counsel is not secured by
the Constitution. 69 The unstated premise of this argument is that
the parolee has no legal right to freedom from incarceration before
the stated term of his sentence has expired. Since the CPA client
likewise has no legal right to be referred for supervision in the
community rather than formally charged with his alleged offense,
the assistance of counsel would seem to be unnecessary insofar as
the sixth amendment is concerned either at the referral stage
when the probation privilege is at stake or when the probation
privilege is withdrawn.
However, the viability of the right-privilege distinction has
become questionable as a result of the decision of the Supreme
Court in Goldberg v. Kelly. 70 In deciding that recipients of wel-
fare benefits were entitled to notice and a hearing before pay-
ments could be terminated, the Court rejected the state's argu-
ment that the constitutional challenge to procedures preceding
withdrawal of benefits could be answered by the assertion that
public assistance benefits are a privilege and not a right.71
In United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut Board of Parole72
the Second Circuit recognized the implications of Goldberg when
it decided contrary to the majority of the federal circuit courts 73
that due process required the assistance of counsel at all parole
revocation proceedings. The court realized that to rely unanalyt-
ically on the act of grace theory as was done in Hyser was no
longer tenable. Rather it held that whether lack of counsel de-
prived parolees of due process involved a consideration of three
factors: (1) the stake of the parolee in the proceedings; (2) the
6 8 See generally Note, Constitutional Law, Parole Status and the Privilege Concept,
1969 DUKE L.J. 1939 (1969).
69 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied sub nom., Thompson v. United States
Parole Bd., 375 U.S. 957 (1963). Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger wrote for the court:
Here there is not the attitude of adverse, conflicting objectives as between
the parolee and the Board inherent between prosecution and defense in a
criminal case. Here we do not have pursuer and quarry but a relationship
partaking of parens patriae. In a real sense the Parole Board in revoking
parole occupies the role of parent withdrawing a privilege from an errant
child not as punishment but for misuse of the privilege.
Id. at 237. But cf., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), where the Supreme Court noted that the
state's role as parens patriae did not prevent the right to counsel from attaching in
delinquency hearings.
70 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
71 Id. at 262.
72443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971). See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Winter in
Beardon v. South Carolina, 443 F.2d 1090, 1096 (4th Cir. 1971).
73 See note 60 supra.
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lawyer's impact on the fairness of the proceedings; and (3) the
foreseeable effects on state institutions recognizing that right. 74
If the Bey analysis is adopted, the close analogy between the
parolee and the CPA participant strongly suggests that although
the assistance of counsel may not be required at the referral stage
of CPA proceedings, due process may require providing counsel
at the revocation stage of CPA proceedings. Whereas the three
factors set forth in the Bey case are present at the revocation
stage of CPA proceedings, perhaps two of these factors are ab-
sent at the referral stage. First, in both cases the CPA client's
interest in the proceedings, conditional freedom from prosecution
and possible incarceration, is similar to that of the parolee. 75
Second, although neither forensic skill, legal training, nor the
advocate's role in a decision-making process qualifies a lawyer for
participation in the referral phase of CPA proceedings, 76 when
revocation of the conditional probation is involved an attorney
should be able to assist CPA in deciding the factual question of
whether the client's behavior constituted a violation of the condi-
tions of his probation. 77 The presence of a lawyer at this hearing
would enhance the fairness of CPA revocation procedures. Final-
ly, while at the referral stage counsel might interfere with the
atmosphere of rehabilitation necessary, the participation of coun-
sel in hearing to decide whether to continue the CPA client's
probation or initiate formal criminal charges would not unduly
disrupt the CPA program.78 Counsel would not introduce friction
between the client and his probation officer, since the right to
counsel would not attach until revocation seemed imminent.79
74 443 F.2d at 1086.
75 Perhaps the interest of the CPA client deserves more protection than that of the
parolee because, unlike the parolee, the CPA client has not been lawfully convicted. See
Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948), for the proposition that conviction of a felony
may permit restrictions of freedoms guaranteed other citizens so far as "justified by the
considerations underlying the penal system."76 The purpose of referral proceedings is to obtain a subjective evaluation of an in-
dividual's amenability to treatment. The lawyer's persuasive powers would not contribute
to this process.
77 United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 197 1).
The court points out that the decision to revoke or grant parole calls for knowledge of
psychology, sociology, and penology-fields in which the lawyer ordinarily has no ex-
pertise. It reasons that the initial parole release decision involves intangible subjective
factors whereas a necessary precondition to reincarceration is a finding of a violation of the
terms of parole. Legal training renders a lawyer able to analyze and organize evidentiary
matter so as to aid the parole board in reaching a just conclusion. The same reasoning
applies to the decisions involved in referral to and revocation of probation See, e.g.,
Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967).
78 See text accompanying note 62 supra.
79 The Bey court applies the same analysis to the case of a parolee:
Nor does our decision threaten to introduce friction into the relationship
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2. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection-Some state
courts, including the Michigan Court of Appeals, hold that even
though due process may not require the assistance of counsel at a
limited parole revocation hearing, fourteenth amendment equal
protection8 ° requires the state to furnish counsel at public expense
to parolees threatened with revocation of probation.8 In Warren
v. Michigan Parole Board,2 the Michigan court overruled an
earlier decision83 that held that neither due process nor the sixth
amendment entitled an indigent parolee to representation by coun-
sel. The Warren court decided that when a statute 84 permits the
parolee to be represented by counsel, the state's failure to appoint
counsel to represent indigent parolees in cases where there is a
factual dispute as to whether there was a violation of probation
constitutes a denial of equal protection.8 5 While no statute applies
to proceedings before CPA, CPA permits retained counsel to
attempt to persuade it to continue probation,8 6 and the Michigan
court's reasoning would seem to dictate that failure to appoint
counsel at a probation revocation hearing, at least when there is a
factual dispute, would deny indigent clients equal protection of
between a parolee and his assigned parole officer. The right to counsel does
not attach until the parole status might imminently be discontinued. Neither
will counsel's participation in proceedings post-dating a parolee's arrest and
incarceration pending his hearing add in any degree to the burden of the
overworked parole officer, or require him to divert his energies from his
rehabilitative to his "patrolman" functions.
443 F.2d at 1088- 89 (2d Cir. 1971).
go U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I.
81 See, e.g., People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600, appeal dismissed, 22
N.Y.2d 857, 293 N.Y.S.2d 117, 239 N.E.2d 743 (1968); Puchalski v. New Jersey State
Parole Bd., 104 N.J. Super. 294, 250 A.2d 19 (1969); contra, Johnson v. Stueber, 203
Kan. 253, 453 P.2d 35 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969).
82 23 Mich. App. 754, 179 N.W.2d 664 (1970), appeal dismissed as moot, 383 Mich.
817 (1971).
83 Sanders v. Michigan Parole Bd. 15 Mich. App. 183, 166 N.W.2d 278 (1968), appeal
denied, 381 Mich. 818 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1025 (1970).
84 MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 791.240a (1968). The Michigan court noted that the
previous statutory provision had been repealed, that as reenacted the clause entitling the
accused to appear with counsel "at his own expense" had been eliminated, and that the
current statute merely provides that an accused may appear "personally or with counsel."
85 The Michigan court expressly reserved the question whether the state would be
required to furnish counsel to indigents if there were no factual dispute as to the violation
of the terms of parole:
Where ... there is a factual dispute, counsel is of fundamental impor-
tance ... and the refusal to appoint counsel for indigent parolees is, there-
fore, a denial of equal protection of the laws. We recognize that counsel
might be of assistance even in a case where the parole violation is admit-
ted .... To decide this case, it is not, however, necessary to express an
opinion whether the denial of counsel denies equal protection in a case where
his function might be limited to a plea to discretion.
23 Mich. App. at 771, 179 N.W.2d at 672.
86 Telephone interview with James B. Wright, Director of the Citizens Probation Au-
thority, Jan. 5, 1972. If a participant in the program retains counsel, his attorney could
attempt to persuade the CPA to recommend extension of his client's probation.
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the law. Even in the absence of a factual dispute, the Warren
holding suggests that it would be appropriate to appoint counsel.8 7
However, it is unclear whether Warren necessitates that coun-
sel be provided at the initial referral stage of the CPA program.
At present, retained counsel can accompany potential clients to
the initial interview but he is not allowed to answer questions or
influence the probation decision. 8 The lawyer's role is limited to
advising his client on whether to accept conditional probation or
to contest the charge. The Warren court noted that an advocate
could attempt to persuade a parole board to parole89 and that
failure to provide counsel to all indigents would deprive them of
equal protection of the laws.90 However, a lawyer cannot attempt
to sway the CPA staff member's decision. The interests of the
indigent CPA candidate would be adequately protected by provid-
ing counsel upon request.9 1 In order to guarantee that all who ask
to consult with a lawyer may do so, it would be advisable to draft
a statute that would provide for counsel for indigent CPA clients
at public expense.
C. Restitution Requirement
The willingness and ability of an offender to make restitution is
a most important factor in the prosecutor's decision whether to
suspend prosecution in favor of voluntary probation in the CPA
program.9 2 If possible, restitution should be made immediately so
that the complainant is completely repaid prior to the time the
prosecutor makes his final decision to accept or deny probation 3
However, if money is still owed at the time the prosecutor must
make a decision, he evaluates efforts made by the CPA candidate
to date and the expectation of his making restitution within the
87 See note 85 supra.
88 Telephone interview with James B. Wright, Director of the Citizens Probation Au-
thority, Jan. 5, 1972. The client is typically accompanied by a lawyer when he has been
arrested and booked over the weekend and the prosecutor's absence prevents referral to
the CPA. Mr. Wright insisted that attorneys do not influence the decision of the CPA staff
to accept an individual; CPA strictly adheres to the criteria set forth in the Prosecutor's
Policy and Procedures for Referral to Citizens Probation Authority.
89 23 Mich. App. at 771, 179 N.W.2d at 672.
90 See part 11 B 2 infra for a discussion of equal protection standards for indigent
offenders.
91 Telephone interview with James B. Wright, Director of the Citizens Probation Au-
thority, Jan. 5, 1972. Clients who question the legality of their arrest generally request a
lawyer. The CPA usually calls the Genesse County Legal Services to advise them that a
potential client has been referred and request that the case receive prompt attention.
92 Prosecutor's Policy and Procedures.93 Id.
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normal probationary period. 94 In addition the CPA candidate is
expected to pay a one hundred dollar probation fee before enter-
ing the CPA program, except that payment is not required in
hardship cases. 95
The restitution requirement and probation fee conform to con-
ditions permitted by statute in Michigan for court-imposed proba-
tion.96 However, the restitution requirement may result in ex-
clusion of indigents from participation in the CPA program. This
possibility raises the issue whether an otherwise referrable in-
digent is denied equal protection of the laws by CPA procedures
that permit a person with means in a similar position to "pur-
chase" eligibility for probation.
In Griffin v. Illinois97 the Supreme Court rejected by implica-
tion the argument that the state is not required to equalize
financial disparities98 and held that failure to furnish at public
expense a trial transcript necessary for appeal denied the indigent
defendant equal protection of the law.99 In Douglas v. Califor-
nia,100 decided six years later, the Court held that an indigent
could not be denied the assistance of counsel on appeal. There-
fore, in the context of criminal proceedings, a statute both fair on
its face and nondiscriminatorily administered by which leads to
one result for the wealthy and another for the poor may violate
the equal protection clause.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Williams v. Illinois'01
and Tate v. Short,'0 2 rely on the Griffin-Douglas analysis for the
decision that imposition of a fine as a sentence and automatic
conversion of it into a jail term solely because of inability of the
defendant to pay the fine immediately in full denies an indigent
94 This probationary period may be extended, however, if restitution is not completed
within the given period, or probation may be terminated with the consent of the com-
plainant. Id.
95 Telephone interview with James B. Wright, Director of the Citizens Probation Au-
thority, Nov. 8, 1971. The $100 fee helps defray CPA costs. Inability to pay the $100 fee
does not, however, preclude referral. The example of a mother on A.D.C. was given as
representative of the type of case in which the probation fee requirement is waived.
9 6MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 771.3 (1968). But a restitution payment not reasonably
related to the offense involved is without authority under the statute. See People v.
Becker, 349 Mich. 476, 84 N.W.2d 833 (1957) (probation order requiring hit and run
driver to compensate injured pedestrians for hospital and medical expenses held invalid);
People v. Sattler, 20 Mich. App. 665, 174 N.W.2d 605 (1969) (defendant who pleaded
guilty to obtaining money by false pretenses must be given opportunity to demonstrate
inaccuracy of amount of restitution determined by auditors).
97351 U.S. 12 (1956).
9 1 Id. at 28.
99 Id. at 19. Mr. Justice Black asserted that "there can be no equal justice when the kind
of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."
100372 U.S. 353 (1963).
101 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
102401 U.S. 395 (1971).
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defendant equal protection. Since confinement was contingent
upon ability to pay, the state imposed different consequences on
two categories of persons without meeting its burden of showing a
substantial and legitimate purpose justifying the discriminatory
result. An important factor in both decisions was the state's lack
of a penological interest in the incarceration of the indigent de-
fendants involved.' 03 In both cases the Court also emphasized the
available alternatives to which the state could resort to avoid
imprisoning indigents for involuntary nonpayment of fines and
implicitly approved procedures for installment payments of
fines.104
Although inability to make restitution does not result in auto-
matic incarceration of a CPA candidate, the rationale for Williams
and Tate nonetheless applies. If an otherwise eligible offender is
automatically denied the rehabilitative advantages of participation
in the CPA program solely because of his inability to make
restitution, the state has established a procedure leading to one
result for the indigent defendant and another for the wealthy. 0 5
Such a result may deny equal protection unless the state can
demonstrate that the requirement of restitution is rationally re-
lated to a substantial state interest. 106
Certain significant state interests are perhaps unique to the
CPA restitution requirement. The requirement may remind the
CPA client of his wrongdoing and so increase his awareness of an
obligation to society. 10 7 Therefore, restitution may be a necessary
part of the CPA rehabilitative program. Furthermore, exclusion of
indigents from the program is not automatic, since payment in
installments is permitted. 0 8 Permitting restitution payments to be
103 Mr. Chief Justice Burger stated for the majority that
once the state has defined the outer limits of incarceration necessary to
satisfy its penological interests and policies, it may not subject a certain class
of convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory
maximum solely by the reason of their indigency.
399 U.S. at 241-42.
104 The Williams Court mentions installment payment plans as a means of avoiding
imprisonment for involuntary nonpayment of fines, 399 U.S. at 244 n.21. After stating that
the state is free to choose from a variety of solutions to the problem of imprisonment of
indigents for nonpayment of fines, the Tate court noted existing procedures for payment of
fines in installments. 401 U.S. at 395 n.5.
105 Mr. Wright estimates that five out of one thousand individuals referred in 197 1 were
denied acceptance into the CPA program solely because they were unable to make
restitution. Telephone interview with James B. Wright, Director of the Citizens Probation
Authority, Jan. 5, 1972.
'06 399 U.S. at 238. The Williams Court rejected the state's contentions that its interest
in the collection of fines justified the incarceration of indigents beyond the maximum term
specified by statute. Also rejected was the argument that the Illinois "work off system"
was a rational means of implementing that policy. Id.
107 For a more thorough presentation of the rehabilitative impact of restitution, see Best
& Birzon, Conditions of Probation:An Analysis, 51 GEo. L. REV. 809, 819 (1963).
108 Summary Description.
SPRING 1972]
Journal of Law Reform
made in installments should therefore preclude a finding that the
restitution requirement deprives indigents of equal protection of
the laws. 10 9
Nonetheless, providing for payment of restitution in in-
stallments does not insure that an unskilled and unemployable
person will not be automatically excluded because of his prospec-
tive inability to make restitution. 1 0 If the accused qualifies for
referral to the CPA on all other grounds, to deny referral because
his unemployable status makes the payment of restitution unlikely
clearly discriminates against the poor and constitutes a denial of
equal protection according to the Griffin and Douglas analyses.
Although the issue is unlikely to be litigated given the difficulty a
rejected individual would have in proving that he was otherwise
eligible for probation, fairness would require that restitution as a
condition of probation be waived or reduced in such cases.
D. Speedy Apprisal of the Charge
If the CPA client has a constitutional right to be speedily
apprised of the charge against him being held in abeyance, it
derives from the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial"' as
made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. 1 2 In
United States v. Marion"3 the United States Supreme Court
indicated that there is no such sixth amendment right to be speed-
ily charged until either a formal indictment or information is filed
or the suspect is subjected to the actual restraints imposed by
arrest and detention to answer a criminal charge.' 14 Nevertheless,
109This procedure has been approved by the United States Supreme Court, albeit in
dictum, as a means of maintaining equal protection for indigents in the context of imprison-
ment for nonpayment of fines. See note 104 supra.
110 The Supreme Court left open the issue whether imprisonment of an indigent for
nonpayment of a fine would violate equal protection when alternative methods of enforce-
ment failed despite a reasonable effort to pay the fine. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401
(1971).
11I The sixth amendment provides that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial."
112 See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), where the Court held that a
procedure whereby the state could postpone prosecution indefinitely on an indictment after
the accused had been discharged because of the jury's inability to reach a verdict denied
the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.
113 404 U.S. 307 (197 I). The Court held that dismissal of an indictment for fraudulent
business practices was not constitutionally required by reason of a three year delay
between the occurrence of the alleged criminal acts and the filing of the indictment.
114 Id. at 320. The Court stated that until arrested "a citizen suffers no restraints on his
liberty and is not the subject of public accusation." Id. at 321. Whether the unique
situation of an individual referred to the CPA and threatened with a potential charge would
be the subject of a public accusuation is unclear. Likewise, if an individual did enter into
the CPA voluntary probation program it is not certain that the terms of probation would be




the Court did concede that if delay in charging a suspected
offender were shown to have caused "substantial prejudice" to
the accused's right to a fair trial and that the delay was a "pur-
poseful device" 115 to gain a tactical advantage over the accused,
the due process clause of the fifth amendment1 16 would require
dismissal. Although the Court stipulated that decision on whether
delay had impaired the accused's rights to a fair trial would
involve a delicate judgment based on the circumstances of the
individual case, 117 decisions of several lower federal courts sug-
gest that certain factors are relevant to a finding of a violation of
the fifth amendment: possible prejudice to the accused because of
his inability to recall details relevant to a defense against the
charge;"18 the unavailability of witnesses necessary to an ade-
quate defense; 19 and purposeful aspects of the government's
delay. 120
By way of analogy these considerations demonstrate the pos-
sible prejudicial effect of failing to inform the CPA participant of
the specific offense with which he may be subsequently charged.
If the CPA client is not notified at the very outset of the crime for
which he was referred, when proceedings are later reinstituted he
may be unable to recall details essential to an adequate defense. 12'
Although the problem of witnesses' becoming unavailable would
still exist, at least the CPA client who was informed of the charge
could soon thereafter discuss relevant details with potential wit-
nesses and thereby increase the probability of their remembering
details relevant to a possible defense. 122 Moreover, full disclosure
115 Id. at 324.
116 The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that no
person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The
Michigan constitution repeats this same guarantee verbatim. MICH. CONST. art. l, § 17.
117 404 U.S. at 325.
18 See Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210, 213- 14 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The defendant, a
man of limited education, was prejudiced by a delay of seven months, since he could not
reconstruct the events of the day on which the alleged offense was committed.
119 United States v. Hauf, 395 F.2d 555, 556-57 (7th Cir. 1968). Although the
court decided that the defendant had not demonstrated prejudice due to preindictment
delay, it emphasized that if the defendant had demonstrated actual prejudice resulting from
the death of a witness, a violation of fifth amendment due process would have been found.120 See United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196, 206 (D.D.C. 1965). Although the
court was reluctant to find that the government purposefully gave priority to a civil rather
than criminal action concerning violations of the Securities Exchange Act to strengthen its
case through the use of civil discovery procedures, this circumstance was a significant
factor in the court's decision to exercise its discretion under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 48(b) to dismiss the indictment.
121 Notice may be a factor in determining whether the accused has been prejudiced. See
United States v. McCray, 433 F.2d 1173, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1970). There, although ten
months elapsed between the offense and arrest, the defendant knew the police were
looking for him and "was on notice as to the charges made against him."
122 The inability of witnesses to recall details necessary to testify in behalf of the
defendant has been a factor contributing to a finding of prejudice. See, e.g., Ross v. United
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would discredit allegations of purposeful delay 23 brought against
the state by CPA clients who ultimately were prosecuted for an
offense initially disposed of by referral to CPA.
Since participation in CPA precedes and usually obviates the
need for initiation of formal proceedings involving the filing of an
indictment 124 or an information, 2 5 the CPA client is never for-
mally informed of the charges against him. 126 Nevertheless, CPA
does adequately safeguard any due process right to be speedily
apprised which the client may arguably possess. The client is
informally apprised of the offense giving rise to his referral during
the initial intake interview with a CPA worker.'2 7 After fully
discussing his unlawful behavior with the CPA worker, the client
is required to complete a "Constitutional Rights Questionnaire"
which includes a question designed to determine whether he un-
derstands the nature of his purported crime.' 28 Therefore, the
CPA client, though not given the opportunity to read a formal
indictment or information at the time of referral, is notified with
reasonable specificity of the offense so that it is unlikely that he
will be deprived of due process by delays preceding the initiation
of a formal criminal action.
E. Reinstatement of Criminal Proceedings
This article has so far dealt with the general legal basis for
CPA-what in the law authorizes such a program, the rights of
clients while participating in the program, and the safeguards
necessary to preserve these rights. This part focuses on the ulti-
mate sanction of the CPA: the reinstitution of criminal proceed-
ings. Or perhaps for "reinstitution" one should read "institution;"
States, 349 F.2d 210, 214-15 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The court found that defendant was
prejudiced when a witness who could have offered exculpatory testimony at trial refused to
do so because she was doubtful of her ability to recall the events of the day of the crime.
Defendant had been indicted seven months after the alleged crime was committed.
123 See note 120 supra.
124 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §767.28 (1968). In order to obtain an indictment the
prosecutor must present a prima facie case to the grand jury.
12 Id. § 767.2. An information may be obtained when the prosecutor presents evidence
sufficient to convict a suspect in the absence of a valid defense.
126 Every person charged with any offense is entitled to a copy of the indictment or
information. Id. § 767.28.
127 Summary Description.
128 Constitutional Rights Questionnaire (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform). The accused client is asked whether he understands that he has been
accused of violating the law by engaging in a specific activity. If he answers no or indicates
that he does not consider his acts to have been criminal, the CPA interviewer discusses
with the client the details of the accusation, including both the acts allegedly committed




for recall that a client's participation in the CPA program, if he is
accepted, begins even before he is formally charged with a crimi-
nal offense. If the client adheres to the terms of his probation, the
entire matter is offically forgotten. If, however, a client violates
the terms of his probation or voluntarily withdraws, the matter is
referred to the county prosecutor, who may decide to press
charges. 129 The following discussion examines the constitutional
questions implicit in such a decision in terms generally of (1) what
warnings must initially be given the CPA participant in light of the
possibility of subsequent prosecution; (2) whether there are limits
on CPA's power to terminate a client's probation against his will;
and (3) whether a client forfeits any constitutional rights by agree-
ing to cooperate with CPA.
1. Warning of Possible Revival of Criminal Charges-One
issue is whether the CPA client has a right to be warned of the
possibility of revival of criminal charges before consenting to
participate in the program. Due process has been held to require
that an accused have the right to prepare his defense when the
evidence against him is fresh. °3 0 Therefore, failure to warn the
client of the possibility of reinstitution of criminal charges based
on the offense that gave rise to his referal would deny him notice
of the charge and thereby deny him due process.' 3 ' Furthermore,
by participating in the CPA program the client has in effect
waived his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.' 3 2 Under the
due process clause, an essential element of an effective waiver' 33
of a constitutional right is knowledge of the possible con-
sequences.' 3 4 If the CPA client is ignorant of the possibility of
ultimately being charged with his original offense, his decision to
129 In 1968, 28 CPA candidates withdrew from the program voluntarily, 203 withdrew
in 1969, and 173 withdrew in 1970. In 1968, 2 clients violated the terms of their probation,
20 did so in 1969, and 35 did so in 1970. All were subject to further prosecution. Citizens
Probation Authority Statistical Comparison-Yearly Summary (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal ofLaw Reform).
130 See text accompanying notes 116-22 supra.
131 See note 121 supra.
132 See text accompanying notes 158- 61 infra.
133 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The Court, per Mr. Justice Douglas. held
that a defendant who pleaded guilty to a charge could not be presumed to have voluntarily
waived his fifth and sixth amendment rights when the record did not show that the trial
judge ascertained whether the defendant was aware of his rights. See also Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (for waiver to be valid under the due process clause, it
must be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege").
134 For example, if a defendant pleads guilty to a crime, he must know the maximum
penalty that can be imposed. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948). In that case,
petitioner brought a habeas corpus action in the federal district court to vacate her plea of
guilty to a charge of conspiring to violate the Espionage Act of 1917. The plea was
tendered without the assistance of counsel. Her plea was vacated, in part because the
record did not show that she was aware of the possible range of penalties. Id. at 724.
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accept voluntary probation and waive his sixth amendment right
to a speedy trial can scarcely be "intelligently" made.
CPA does effectively disclose the possibility of initiation of
formal criminal proceedings if the client voluntarily withdraws or
violates the terms of his probation. At the intake interview CPA
provides potential clients with a "Constitutional Rights" booklet
which sets forth this information in bold face type.13 5 The CPA
interviewer discusses the booklet with the client in detail in order
to be sure that he understands the information contained therein.
However, the "Constitutional Rights Questionnaire" which the
client is required to complete at the end of the discussion does not
inquire as to whether the individual understands that
non-prosecution is contingent upon successful completion of pro-
bation. Such a question should be included to be sure that the
accused cannot subsequently attack his waiver on the ground that
it was not intelligently made.
The same reasoning compels the conclusion that at the time of
referral the candidate should be told of his alternative right to a
jury trial. By agreeing to accept one year's voluntary probation,
the CPA client temporarily waives his sixth amendment right to a
jury trial. The jury trial he receives at a later date may not be of as
high quality as a jury trial at the time of referal would have been
when the evidence for and against him was fresher.13 6 The client
therefore should be informed of the alternative of a jury trial in
order for permanent waiver of fifth amendment rights to be
effective.137
The CPA "Constitutional Rights" booklet saliently lists the
right of a trial by jury as one of the constitutionally guaranteed
rights of a criminally accused person. In addition, the CPA ques-
tionnaire includes a question asking the potential client whether
he understands that he has a right to answer any accusations
made against him in a court of law.138 In order to protect the CPA
client against unintelligent waiver of his right to a trial by jury,
135 Summary Description.
136 See text accompanying notes 116- 22 supra.
137 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The case involved vacating the petitioner's
plea of guilty. A guilty plea may result in either incarceration or probation, both of which
restrict an individual's liberty. The analogy of entering a guilty plea to a decision to
participate in the CPA program is particularly compelling since the consequences of
pleading guilty and participating in the CPA program are so similar, that is, possible
incarceration or probation as opposed to a judicial adjudication of guilt or innocence of the
charge.
138 Your Rights as a Citizen When You Are Accused of an Offense, 1971- 1972
(available at the Citizens Probation Authority ofGenesee County, and also on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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this question could be altered slightly by adding the phrase "be-
fore a jury composed of your equals" to the question.
2. Prior Adversary Hearing-One aspect of participation in
CPA is that the government does not relinquish its right to prose-
cute until after the client has satisfactorily completed his year's
probation. This immunity from prosecution is a matter of grace,
given by the government in exchange for good behavior and
participation in the program; it is therefore revocable during the
probation period. While the threat of reinstitution of criminal
proceedings is a reasonable sanction for the government to retain,
constitutional fairness would seem to require safeguards against
the arbitrary use of this power.
The United States Supreme Court inEscoe v. Zerbst, 3 9 a 1934
opinion that has never been overruled, held that the Constitution
did not require a probation-revocation hearing. The Court rea-
soned that because probation is an "act of grace," it may be
granted on whatever conditions the legislature chooses.' 40 This is,
of course, the classic right-privilege distinction since abandoned
by the Court in other contexts. 141
Although some courts still follow the old precedent, 42 the
better-reasoned opinions, including decisions in at least two feder-
al courts of appeals, 143 hold that modern notions of due process
require a hearing before probation or parole can be revoked. In
Hahn v. Burke,' 44 for example, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit declined to follow Escoe, finding
139295 U.S. 490 (1935). Petitioner was entitled to a probation-revocation hearing
because of a federal statute and not because there was any constitutional right to one.140 1 d. at 492-93.
141 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unemployment benefits cannot be
conditioned on an infringement of constitutionally guaranteed religious liberty); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (public assistance benefits cannot be granted on condi-
tions violative of equal protection). In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court
held that due process required an evidentiary hearing before welfare benefits could be
terminated. The Court said:
The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument that public
assistance benefits are "a 'privilege' and not a 'right."' ... The extent to
which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by
the extent to which he may be "condemned to suffer grievous loss," Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring), and depends upon whether the recipient's in-
terest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary
adjudication.
397 U.S. at 262-63, See also Mempha v.*Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), discussed in part 11
B supra.
142 See, e.g., Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968)
(due process does not require a hearing prior to parole revocation).
143 Murray v. Page, 429 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1970) (parole revocation); Hahn v. Burke,
430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (197 1) (probation revocation).
144430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971).
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that the "holding" that probation is a privilege and can be granted
on any conditions whatever was in reality only dicta, indeed dicta
the basis for which "has all but been obliterated by recent Su-
preme Court opinions." 145 Applying the balancing test of Gold-
berg v. Kelly,' 46 the court determined that due process required a
hearing prior to probation revocation.1 47
Arguably the Hahn holding does not apply to the CPA situ-
ation, since the traditional probationer faces imprisonment should
his probation be revoked, while the CPA probationer faces only a
criminal prosecution and the possibilty of incarceration. But im-
munity from possible loss of liberty is a substantial interest. More-
over, this interest is hardly outweighed by the slight governmental
interest in "summary adjudication.' 48 True, the government need
not grant immunity from prosecution; but if it does, it should not
be able to revoke that immunity without meeting the requirements
of due process, which in these circumstances would seem to entail
a hearing at which the client could present his side of the case.
Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated section 771.4 guarantees
a probationer a hearing before his probation can be revoked. a49 It
must be noted, however, that this statute applies by its terms only
to court-imposed probation, not to a CPA-type program. The
explanation for this is probably not that the legislature meant to
exclude other forms of probation from the guarantee, but that in
1947 when the law was passed, programs like CPA did not exist.
The legislature was thinking only in terms of traditional
145430 F.2d at 105.
146 See note 141 supra.
147 As the court states:
Weighing the "extent to which he [the petitioner] may be condemned to
grievous loss" against "the governmental interest in summary adjudication"
we find the petitioner's loss of freedom to outweigh the added state burden of
providing a limited hearing to allow petitioner to be confronted with his
probation violation and to be heard.
The state need not grant probation, but if it does so, it should not be able
to arbitrarily revoke such probation without giving petitioner a reasonable
opportunity to explain away the accusation that he had violated the condi-
tions upon which his probation was granted .... To allow the state to sum-
marily revoke the petitioner's probation without a hearing to determine if the
conditions upon which the probation was granted have been violated, is state
action inconsistent with the due process guarantees of the fourtheenth
amendment.
430 F.2d at 104.
148 The most obvious governmental interest in allowing CPA to act unilaterally, without
a prior hearing, in terminating a client's probation and referring his case back to the
county prosecutor is the interest in avoiding the delay and expense inherent in any kind of
hearing. In Hahn the court found that these considerations were outweighed by the
petitioner's loss of freedom. See 430 F.2d 104 n.3.
149 MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 771.4 (1968) provides in pertinent part: "the proba-
tioner shall be entitled to a written copy of the charges against him which constitute the
claim that he violated his probation, and shall be entitled to a hearing thereon."
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court-imposed probation. In any event, the policy thrust of the
statute clearly indicates that the legislature was concerned with
guaranteeing rights to probationers and not with limiting that
guarantee to a particular type of probation. Thus, though courts
have never been asked to apply the hearing requirement of the
statute to situations other than the revocation of the typical proba-
tion imposed by the sentencing court,'150 it would not be difficult
for them to construe the section to apply to the CPA context,
using the legislative intent indicated above as the basis for its
reasoning.
Michigan statutory law, then, would appear to require at least a
limited hearing before CPA probation could be terminated with-
out the client's consent. Even if the courts should find section
771.4 inapplicable to CPA probation, recent constitutional deci-
sions indicate that modern notions of due process, quite in-
dependently of any statutory mandate, require a limited hearing
before CPA probation can be revoked. 151 Of course, if probation
is being revoked because the client committed a crime while on
probation, the trial which resulted in his conviction on that second
offense would satisfy the hearing requirement.
3. Speedy Trial-A CPA client whose probation was termi-
nated after, say, ten months might argue at a subsequent trial on
his original offense that the government had intentionally delayed
his trial, that his recollection of the events in question was no
longer fresh, and that his ability to find witnesses had been ham-
pered. The argument would conclude that the prosecution denied
him his right to a speedy trial by encouraging and permitting his
participation in the CPA program. If such an argument were
150 In People v. Roberson, 22 Mich. App. 664, 177 N.W.2d 712 (1970), the court
applied the protection of section 771.4 to revocation of a juvenile's status as a youthful
trainee. The Youthful Trainee Act, MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 762.11-.16 (1968) does
not provide the same procedural guarantees as section 771.4. However, applying an equal
protection concept and reasoning from In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the court gave
juveniles under the Youthful Trainee Act the same rights as adult probationers. 177
N.W.2d at 714.
While the equal protection argument might be useful for extending these guarantees to
CPA probationers, there are significant differences by which one can distinguish a CPA
probationer from the typical situation, the main difference being the fact that the CPA
probationer has not been convicted. The most promising method for extending the appli-
cation of section 771.4 to the CPA probationer seems to involve the argument that the
legislature's mention of post-conviction probation cannot be read as an intentional ex-
clusion of other types of probation.
151 CPA should establish regulations governing the conduct of such hearings. The
proceedings should be of an adversary nature, and the client should be represented by
counsel. See part II B supra. Judicial interpretations of section 771.4 indicate that proba-
tion-revocation hearings need not be elaborate or formal, but the probationer must be
given a reasonable opportunity to answer the charges against him, including the right to
call witnesses in his behalf. See People v. Wood, 2 Mich. App. 342, 139 N.W.2d 895
(1966); People v. Hazen, 19 Mich. App. 576, 172 N.W.2d 860 (1969).
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accepted, the government's retention of its right to press charges
on the CPA client's original offense upon premature termination
of probation would be of little use.
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment, 152 as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment.' 53 In addition, the Michigan constitution, 54 as implemented
by statute, x55 provides the same guarantee. However, it appears
fairly certain that this right would not bar a trial after revocation
of CPA probation, either because it never attached or because the
defendant will be deemed to have waived the right.
Since a client's participation in CPA takes place entirely before
he is formally charged, it seems doubtful that his right to a speedy
trial ever attaches. The Supreme Court recently held that the
constitutional right to a speedy trial does not vest until after
prosecution is instituted.156 Rather, delays in arrest and in-
dictment are controlled by the applicable statute of limitations. 57
Even if a court finds that the right to a speedy trial attaches at
the point an individual is first referred to CPA,158 it could go on to
find that the client-defendant effectively waived that right under
all the circumstances. The right to a speedy trial is easily
waived, 159 especially in Michigan where the courts have adopted
what might be termed a presumption of waiver. The right to a
speedy trial never even attaches unless and until a defendant
152 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial ...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
153 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 123 (1967). See note 112 supra.
'
54 MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 20.
155 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.38 (1968).
151 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971). The Court indicated that the right to a
speedy trial might attach at the time of arrest, which could be well before the time of
formal indictment. Id. at 320. Thus, Marion does not absolutely foreclose the CPA
probationer from arguing that his sixth amendment rights have been violated. Never-
theless, his sixth amendment argument would probably be frustrated by the doctrine of
waiver. See discussion in text accompanying notes 158-61 infra.
157 While the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial does not itself govern pre-
indictment delays, the Court in Marion stated that in some cases the fifth amendment due
process clause would offer relief. Significantly, though, the Court indicated that the fifth
amendment might not require dismissal of the charges unless the defendant demonstrated
both that the pre-indictment delay was a "purposeful device to gain tactical advantage
over the accused." 404 U.S. at 324. In any event, the accused would have to demonstrate
actual prejudice to his rights. Id. However, the prominent characteristics of the CPA
situation, not the least of which are the lack of oppressive governmental purpose in causing
the delay and the voluntariness of the defendant's participation, are strong arguments
against dismissing a subsequent prosecution on due process grounds. Note also that one of
the primary ways in which pre-indictment delay causes a defendant prejudice, i.e., lack of
timely notice of the charges against him, is effectively blocked in the CPA situation, since
the client is informed of his suspected offense immediately upon referral to CPA. See
discussion in part II D supra.
158 See notes 156-571 supra.
159 See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302 (1958).
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demands it.1 60 In the CPA context, therefore, waiver would work
to bar a client-defendant from asserting that his right to a speedy
trial had been denied. The actions of the CPA client constitute
more than mere failure to demand a speedy trial, which alone
would be enough to waive the right. By agreeing to participate in
the CPA program, the client affirmatively acquiesces in whatever
delay occurs. 16 '
4. Self-Incrimination-The fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination,' 62 made applicable to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,163 is repeated
verbatim in the Michigan constitution.' 6 4 Since the right is a
personal one, it can be waived when a witness, with knowledge of
the privilege, voluntarily gives testimony on matters as to which
he could claim the privilege.' 6 5 There are several perceived dan-
gers to this constitutionally guaranteed protection against
self-incrimination where a defendant stands trial subsequent to the
premature termination of his CPA probation.
First, CPA participants uniformly assume moral responsibility
for their alleged offenses.166 A statement admitting guilt, made by
the defendant to his CPA staff worker, might later be introduced
at trial and used against him. The admission required16 7 of the
180 See, e.g., People v. Foster, 261 Mich. 247, 246 N.W. 60 (1933) (no good cause was
shown for the government's delay in bringing the case to trial, but defendants could not
complain because they had made no demand in open court nor filed any motion requesting
a speedy trial). In accord, People v. Duncan, 373 Mich. 650, 130 N.W.2d 385 (1964), and
People v. Kennedy, 23 Mich. App. 6, 178 N.W.2d 144 (1970). This demand requirement
in Michigan was found compatible with the United States Constitution in People v.
Frazier, 16 Mich. App. 38, 167 N.W.2d 481 (1969).
181 It might even be argued that by agreeing to participate in CPA the client-defendant
causes the delay. Where delays are caused by the defendant, the case for waiver is
certainly stronger than where there is only failure to demand a speedy trial. See People v.
Nawrocki, 6 Mich. App. 46, 150 N.W.2d 516 (1967), and People v. Wallace, 33 Mich.
App. 182, 189 N.W.2d 861 (1971).
The CPA client is free to terminate his participation in the CPA program at any time,
with the understanding that he then makes himself amenable to criminal prosecution at the
discretion of the prosecutor. Presumably, if a CPA client's participation in the program
were prematurely terminated, either by voluntary action on the part of the client or by
revocation of probation, his right to a speedy trial would attach upon his demand for same
after he is formally charged.
162 "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .... U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
183 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), and Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965),
overruling Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
184 MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
185 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966); Duckworth v. Dist.
Court, 220 Iowa 1350, 264 N.W. 714 (1936).
168 See text accompanying note 25 supra. This generally occurs during the preliminary
intake interview. Since the primary purpose of the program is rehabilitative, CPA views
the client's assumption of responsibility for the alleged offense as essential to the "reality
therapy" approach used for reforming anti-social conduct. Summary Description.167 The term "required" is used advisedly. Since the entire thrust of the CPA program is
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CPA participant is in no sense an admission of legal guilt. It is
merely an assumption of personal responsibility for the physical
actions which constitute the alleged offense, without regard to any
justifications or legal defenses which might be available at an
actual trial. Thus at no time is the CPA participant required to
confess to a crime, in the legal sense of that phrase. In addition,
all such statements are made only in oral conversation with the
probation officer; written statements are not taken. 168 Never-
theless, testimony of the probation officer concerning admissions
made at the intake interview could be very damaging to the
defendant at a later trial.
Second, a defendant's participation in the CPA program could
itself imply guilt quite apart from any specific statements made by
the defendant while a CPA client. If the jury were told of CPA's
routine "assumption of responsibility" requirement, the fact of
participation would be especially damning. Even without such
detailed knowledge of the program, a jury might very well reason
that an innocent man would have demanded a trial from the
beginning, and that the defendant, having participated in CPA,
must be guilty. 169
Because the Supreme Court's holding in Miranda v. Arizona 70
would seem to make such self-incriminating evidence inadmissible
at a subsequent trial as direct proof of the defendant's guilt, there
is no constitutional requirement that CPA warn participants of
their right not to incriminate themselves. Moreover, because ad-
vising the participant of his right to remain silent would be detri-
mental to the purposes of CPA,' 71 no such warnings are given.
Nevertheless, there is still a possibility that such evidence would
come before the jury for purposes of impeaching the defendant
should he decide to testify on his own behalf.'7 2 Moreover, recent
cases challenging the scope of the Miranda holding foreshadow
the possibility of a Supreme Court decision restricting Miranda
rehabilitative and not punitive, it is a psychological necessity that the CPA client honestly
acknowledge responsibility for his behavior. Yet it is seldom necessary to "require" this
acknowledgment in any formal sense. Most CPA clients freely and without being asked
admit to their participation in the alleged offense. Telephone interview with James B.
Wright, Director of the Citizens Probation Authority, Oct. 27, 1971.
Those who insist on their innocence are free to decline participation in CPA, thereby
forcing the prosecutor to prove their guilt in a court of law.
168 Telephone interview with James B. Wright, Director of the Citizens Probation
Authority, Oct. 27, 1971.
169 Obviously, the validity of such an assumption is open to question. An innocent
person caught in suspicious circumstances might very well agree to participate in CPA in
order to avoid the expense, dangers, and stigma of a criminal trial.
170384 U.S. 436 (1966).
171 See text following note 174 infra.
17 2 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
[VOL. 5:3
Non-Trial Disposition
and perhaps making the statements of CPA clients admissible at
trial. 173
The one person who is in a position to make these potential
dangers to CPA participants a reality is the prosecutor. However,
it seems clear that if the prosecutor were to make a systematic
effort to use CPA-obtained information as incriminating evidence
at subsequent trials, the willingness of suspected offenders to
participate in CPA would be significantly diminished. The prose-
cutor instituted CPA and is committed to the program's success.
Thus it seems unlikely that he would risk destruction of his own
program, a program that is of great benefit to his office, 174 by
exploiting it for the sake of criminal convictions.
Nevertheless, the possibilities for abuse are apparent. One
way to protect CPA participants against such possibilities would
be to advise them at the intake interview of-their right not to
incriminate themselves. It is obvious, though, that one result of
adopting such a policy would be to inhibit communication be-
tween the CPA participant and his interviewer. It would change
the atmosphere of the interview from cooperation to adversari-
ness. Since CPA's primary purpose is rehabilitative, it is impor-
tant to maintain a relationship of confidence and full disclosure
between the client and the CPA worker. To give Miranda-type
warnings would be counter-productive to the maintenance of such
a relationship.
An alternative method for protecting the CPA participant, and
one that would advance rather than inhibit the purpose of the
program, would be the enactment of a state statute making all
CPA matters, even the fact of participation itself, privileged mate-
rial and inadmissible at trial. Not only would such a statute
prevent the possibility of the prosecutor's taking unfair advantage
of CPA participants who later become defendants, 75 it would
encourage full communication between participant and counselor,
and further it would make the law's treatment of those on CPA
probation consistent in'this regard with its treatment of those
serving traditional probation. 76
173 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ware, _ Pa. ., 284 A.2d 700 (197 1), cert.
granted sub nora., Pennsylvania v. Ware, 40 U.S.L.W. 3449 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1972).174 The program helps relieve crowded prosecutor and court dockets, with consequent
savings of time and money. The low recidivism rate of CPA participants (under 4 percent)
indicates that the program provides more than temporary relief. Summary Description.
175 See note 129 supra.
176 See MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.229 (1968) giving privileged status to commu-
nications made while an offender is serving a court-imposed probation.
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III. CONCLUSION
There are a number of legal problems, most of a constitutional
nature, with CPA's current operating procedures. Though none of
these problems is necessarily fatal to the program, especially since
many are of such a nature that they are not likely to be challenged
in court, still they ought to be corrected. Some needed changes,
such as more elaborate information for the participant as to his
constitutional rights and the institution of an adversary hearing
before probation can be revoked, can be effected by CPA itself as
an administrative matter. In other areas, CPA should seek the
enactment of new state statutes, specifically to provide explicit
authorization for the program and to make participation in CPA a
privilege matter for evidentiary purposes.
These are all relatively minor changes. The basic thrust and
goals of the program remain unobjectionable. As the facilities of
the traditional criminal process, particularly the courts and the
prisons, continue to become increasingly congested, and as the
wisdom of the traditional dispostion of criminal offenders (in-
carceration) is called into question, the value of alternative means
of disposition becomes apparent. Programs like CPA fulfill not
only the need for relief of crowded conditions but also the need
for effective and workable programs for the treatment of criminal
offenders for whom typical conviction and imprisonment are in-
appropriate.
-Nancy S. Warder
and
David C. Zalk
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